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Abstract 
Question: This study analyzes the effect of pharmaceutical price regulation on the launch of new drugs. 
Obtaining regulatory approval for a price may entail administrative delay. In addition, since a low price in 
one market may “spill-over” to other markets, through parallel trade and external referencing, 
manufacturers may rationally prefer longer delay or non-launch of drugs to accepting a relatively low 
price, particularly for high-volume drugs that would be targets for parallel trade. However, the 
manufacturer’s opportunity cost of launch delay is greater, the larger the drug’s potential sales. We use 
IMS data to examine the effects of expected price, expected market size, country indicators, and other 
factors on new drug launch.  
 
Data/Methods: To focus on drugs with potentially global markets, we limit the sample to new chemical 
entities (NCEs) launched in the UK or US outpatient market between October, 1994 and October, 1998. 
There are 85 such NCEs, representing 36 therapeutic classes. The 25 countries represent the major 
pharmaceutical markets, including 14 EU countries. Each NCE’s expected price and market size in each 
country are estimated using lagged price per unit and lagged market size of competitor drugs in the same 
(or related) therapeutic class in Quarter 3 and Quarter 4 prior to its first worldwide launch. In addition to 
expected price and volume, other explanatory variables include: home country of the launch firm, a firm’s 
total sales at the beginning of our study period, main therapeutic class indicators, and country indicators. 
We use the Cox proportional hazard model to analyze the effects of these variables on the delay or non-
occurrence of launch, relative to the first launch in any country. We also test for effects of the accelerated 
authorization procedure introduced by the European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA) in 1995.  
 
Results: There are 1,167 observed launches during our study period, or about 55% of the potential 
maximum. The US leads with 73 launches, followed by Germany (66) and the UK (64). Only 13 NCEs 
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are launched in Japan, 26 in Portugal and 28 in New Zealand. Countries that have fewer launches tend to 
have a longer average launch lag. Expected price and market size have a significantly positive effect on 
launch probability (both p<0.001), i.e. both reducing launch delay, with a larger effect for expected price. 
Characteristics of the originator firm, specifically, launch in its home country and its global experience, 
are also significant. Controlling for expected price and volume, some country effects are still significant:  
Japan is most negative (Hazard Ratio 0.071), followed by Portugal (Hazard Ratio 0.156) and New 
Zealand (Hazard Ratio 0.185). Within the EU, the likely parallel export countries have the longest delays. 
We find no evidence that this effect increased with the EMEA; however, this conclusion is tentative 
because of the small sample (29) of drugs approved through the EMEA centralized procedure. These 
findings are robust to alternative sample design, NCE-stratified Cox analysis, and logit analysis.  
 
Conclusions: Our results suggest that countries with lower prices or smaller market size experience longer 
delays in access to new drugs. Other country-specific effects are also significant, controlling for price and 
volume. Whether such delays affect health outcomes for consumers, utilization of other medical services 
and total health expenditures is not addressed here. 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the role of pharmaceutical price regulation as a contributor 
to delays in new drug launch. Delay in launch of new drugs is costly to consumers, who forego the 
benefits of the new drug. It is also costly to manufacturers, because the drug’s patent continues to run 
regardless of whether the product is on the market.1 Thus each day of delay is a day of on-patent revenues 
foregone, which can be worth millions of dollars for high volume drugs. Delays in launch of new drugs 
increased in the US following the 1962 amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, which 
required that manufacturers show proof of efficacy in addition to safety and good manufacturing practices 
(GMP), before obtaining authorization to market the drug, and other countries adopted similar measures. 
Several studies in the 1970s and 1980s documented the US “drug lag,” relative to other industrialized 
countries.2  
                                                 
1 Under the Uruguay round of GATT, countries that are signatories to GATT grant 20 years of patent life, from the 
date the patent is filed. For pharmaceuticals, the patent is typically filed before the drug enters clinical trials, which 
may take 5-12 years. To (partially) make up for this loss of patent life due to the regulatory requirements of market 
authorization, some countries grant some patent term extension e.g. the US Waxman Hatch Act and the EU 
Supplemental Protection Certificate for medicinal products grant up to five years patent extension. However, such 
patent term extensions are based on delay in market authorization, not delay in obtaining price/reimbursement 
approval. 
2 For example, Peltzman (1973), Wardell (1973), Wardell and Lasagna (1975), and Grabowski, Vernon, and Thomas 
(1978) measured the costs and benefits of the increased delay following the new requirements for proof of efficacy. 
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In the 1990s, the US and the countries of the European Union (EU) adopted initiatives to 
accelerate the regulatory approval process. The US adopted user fees, which are paid by companies that 
submit drugs for regulatory review and are used to hire more reviewers. In 1995, the EU established the 
European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA), which offers a centralized EU-wide authorization 
process as an alternative to going through each country’s own regulatory authority, as was previously 
required. A second alternative under the auspices of the EMEA is the mutual recognition approach. Under 
mutual recognition, the originator firm submits the NCE for approval in one country and files for mutual 
recognition in other countries; once this rapporteur country has granted approval, the drug is 
automatically approved in the other countries unless they object within 90 days. Since its inception in 
1995, the centralized procedure was required for biotechnology products (List A); it is optional for other 
products (List B) but more pharmaceutical manufacturers have chosen it in recent years. These measures 
have significantly reduced delays in authorization. The EMEA centralized procedure reduced approval 
times to approximately 15 months (CMR International, 2001), and drug manufacturers are increasingly 
using the EMEA centralized procedure. 
In addition to proof of safety and efficacy, many countries also require that the manufacturer of a 
new drug obtain approval of the price as a condition of reimbursement through their health care systems. 
Most industrialized countries require such price/reimbursement approval, although details of the 
regulatory system differ across countries. The main exceptions are the UK, the US, and Germany, 
although in the UK towards the end of our period reimbursement for some drugs was increasingly subject 
to advisory review by the National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE). Thus the total delay can have 
several components: manufacturer delay in submitting the drug for market authorization, regulatory delay 
in obtaining authorization, delay in submitting for price or reimbursement approval, and delay in 
obtaining price or reimbursement approval. Not all elements apply in all countries.  
Previous studies have documented average launch delays for various countries and time periods, 
with recent focus mainly on the European Union (EU). Precise measures differ, depending on the 
countries under study, the time period, the sample of drugs and the measure of delay. Data on each of the 
separate components of delay are generally not available. The Boston Consulting Group (1999) reports 
that countries with more regulation tend to get access to new drugs relatively later than those with fewer 
regulations. Greece, Belgium, and France had the longest average delay between drug approval and 
marketing (over 9 months), whereas Germany, the US, and the UK had the shortest average delay (less 
than 2 months). For the EU countries, Europe Economics (1999) reports the average days from 
application for mutual recognition to award and the average days from application(s) for price and 
reimbursement to award(s). In Belgium, France, Greece and Portugal, the delay in obtaining 
reimbursement approval was at least twice as long as the delay in market authorization. The Portuguese 
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industry association (APIFARMA) regularly surveys time taken to achieve 
marketing/price/reimbursement approvals in Portugal and reports significant differences based on the 
authorization route used – EMEA centralized procedure, mutual recognition or national. For brand 
products, the mutual recognition route had the shortest average marketing approval time and the national 
route had the shortest average reimbursement approval time during 1998-2001. During the 1998-1999 
period, 37 out of the total 52 new molecule entities were approved for market authorization in the EU 
countries through the EMEA centralized procedure (CMR International, 2001). CMR International (2000) 
examined the country of first launch for new molecular entities and found a shift from Europe and Japan 
in the early 1990s toward predominantly the US as country of first launch in the late 1990s. Healy and 
Kaitin (1999) report concordance of overall review time between the EMEA centralized procedure and 
the US FDA. For some markets, notably Japan, delays in market authorization appear to have increased.  
As the authorization process becomes more streamlined, price and reimbursement negotiations 
may play a relatively more important role in recent launch delays. According to The Lex Column in 
Financial Times (A fine balance: Pharmaceuticals. July 19, 2001), “Plans to speed up drugs approvals in 
the European Union could be a useful pick-me-up for pharmaceutical companies. … But the EU’s 
centralized approvals procedure is already relatively efficient. The problem is that national authorities 
subsequently set prices and decide on including drugs in the reimbursable list for their healthcare systems. 
The key to speeding drugs to market lies in accelerating this second tier.” Figure 1 shows trends in total 
delay and post-authorization delay in the early and late 1990s as reported by the UK Pharmaceutical 
Industry Competition Task Force (2001, originally Figure 4.1 in the report).  
Companies have strong financial incentives to launch as early as possible, because the drug’s 
patent continues to run regardless of whether the product is on the market. However, in recent years the 
growth of parallel trade in the EU and the tendency for countries to regulate their domestic prices based 
on prices in other countries (hereafter, external referencing) mean that a low price granted to one country 
may undermine the price the firm can obtain in another country (Danzon, 1997, 1998; Huttin, 1999). The 
risk of price spillovers is expected to make companies more willing to delay launch or forego launch 
entirely in low-priced countries, particular in countries where potential sales volume is small. 
Evidence on the causes of delay is sparse. None of the studies for the 1990s has used multivariate 
analysis to test for effects of price regulation and other characteristics of the country, the drug or the 
firm(s) responsible for launch, nor do they examine how manufacturers trade off between price and delay 
and how this may vary by market size. Another limitation of previous studies is the lack of focus on 
important, potentially global new drugs. The total number of NCEs launched worldwide includes many 
that are not submitted for approval in all countries, in particular, not in the FDA, the EMEA and the UK 
Medicines Evaluation Agency. Since the US and Europe are large potential markets, the failure to seek 
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approval in these countries suggests that these compounds would probably not pass the stringent 
standards of efficacy set by these and other relatively strict regulatory authorities. Including in the 
analysis these compounds that do not have the potential for global launch could bias estimates of the 
determinants of delay for the global compounds. The availability of NCEs varied significantly across 
major markets in the 1990s. There were a total of 413 new molecular entities, with the highest number 
launched in the US (229) but only 35 were available in all of the 7 major markets (US, UK, Germany, 
Japan, France, Canada, and Australia). (CMR International, 1999)  
Previous studies may be subject to further bias by their treatment of censoring or non-launch in 
some countries. Estimates of average delay in a country, based solely on the products that were launched 
in that country, may be biased because the products that were launched are not a random sample and 
because the resulting averages reflect different products and time periods in each country. Or, previous 
studies typically use the end of their study periods to calculate delays for not-yet-launched new drugs. 
These limitations may lead to underestimation of the true differences in launch delay.  
In this study, we focus on a sample of 85 potentially global compounds, defined as NCEs that 
were launched in the US or the UK outpatient market. Since these countries are widely recognized as 
having relatively stringent standards for market authorization, drugs that enter at least one of these 
countries can be assumed to have potential for global launch. We use a Cox proportional hazard model to 
estimate the effect of expected price, expected volume and other factors on lags in launch in 25 major 
markets. We test for differences between the 14 EU countries and the other countries. Our data do not 
distinguish between lags in market authorization and lags in price approval. However, we do test for 
differential effects among the 14 EU countries for the 29 NCEs that went through the EMEA centralized 
authorization procedure. For these NCEs, market authorization occurred simultaneously for all countries, 
hence the observed delays are purely related to price/reimbursement approval.  
We find that launch is significantly positively related to expected price, with or without country 
fixed effects, and some of the country effects are significant. This suggests that price regulation does 
contribute significantly to launch delay, and that other country-specific factors also play a role. Launch 
delay is negatively related to the NCE’s expected sales volume, consistent with the hypothesis that 
manufacturers rationally weigh foregone sales in their launch strategies. We find similar results for the 
sample of EMEA-approved NCEs, with larger effects of price, although significance levels are lower for 
the EMEA sample when we include country fixed effects, possibly due to the small sample of EMEA 
NCEs. The similarity of results between the EMEA sample and the full sample suggests that the results 
for the full sample reflect primarily delay in the price/reimbursement approval process rather than market 
authorization.  
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Theoretical Model 
We hypothesize that the launch outcomes (price and date) reflect the interactions of the drug 
manufacturer and the government agencies in a two-stage process of market authorization and 
price/reimbursement negotiation. In general, the government is willing to accept delay in launch, rather 
than accept a price that it considers unjustified or that would lead to expenditures in excess of its target 
for drug spending. The concern for budgetary impact leads to greater focus on drugs with relatively large 
potential sales. The objective of the firm is to get prompt market access at a profit-maximizing price. 
While the firm may traditionally have accepted a lower price in return for speedier market access, 
particularly in large markets such as France, this strategy is less attractive with the breakdown of market 
separability due to parallel trade and external referencing. Thus if a firm accepts a low price in say 
France, it will not only undermine its future price in a not-yet-launched country, say, Italy, due to external 
reference pricing, but also undermine its current higher price in, say, the UK, due to parallel exports from 
France. Consequently, it may be preferable to continue negotiations for a higher price in France, because 
the delay-induced loss of sales in France may be less than the revenue loss that would occur in other 
markets due to spill-over of a low price in France through parallel trade and external referencing. This 
simple model implies that firms would attempt to price within a relatively narrow band throughout the 
EU, where price spillovers are particularly significant.  The firm may accept delay rather than agree to a 
relatively low price and, in the limit, may forgo launch entirely if the government does not accept its 
minimum ask price.  
This trade-off between price and delay is expected to differ across markets and across products 
within markets. In particular, the larger the potential market for the new drug, the higher the 
manufacturer’s opportunity cost of foregone sales due to launch delay. Thus other things equal, launch is 
expected to occur sooner in large markets and large market size is expected to (partially) mitigate the 
positive association between price and speed to market.  
More formally, the observed outcomes of price and launch lag reflect a bargaining process 
between the government and the firm. Bargaining resolves in launch of the product if the government’s 
maximum offer price, Po exceeds the firm’s minimum ask price, Pa. The greater the difference between 
the government’s offer and the firm’s minimum ask, Pa - Po, the longer the delay in launch.  
This theoretical framework suggests a four-equation structural model. The first two equations 
model the determinants of the firm’s minimum ask price and the regulator’s maximum offer. The third 
equation models the delay in launch, as a function of the firm’s ask price and the regulator’s maximum 
offer. The fourth equation models the actual launch price, conditional on launch. Given the limitations of 
our data, in this paper we estimate a reduced form equation for the delay in launch, as a function of the 
determinants of the firm’s ask price and the regulator’s offer price. As a proxy for the government’s offer 
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price, we use the quantity-weighted average price of competitor products in the same therapeutic class as 
the drug to be launched, in Quarter 3 and Quarter 4 prior to the date of the drug’s first launch in any 
country. This can also be interpreted as the firm’s expected price and as a rough measure of the extent of 
price regulation. The firm’s ask price is expected to be higher, the greater the potential for spillovers from 
that country. In particular, countries in the EU are most exposed to spillovers than non-EU countries, 
because the EU permits parallel trade between EU member countries, but not from outside the EU. 
Moreover, several EU countries and Canada use external referencing formally or informally in their price 
regulatory process. The risk of parallel trade is also expected to be higher for high-volume products than 
for smaller volume products, for which it is less worthwhile for the parallel trades to incur the fixed costs 
of obtaining a license etc. However, the larger the potential market, the greater the opportunity cost of 
delay for the firm. Thus the net effect of market size on the firm’s ask price is negative, if the opportunity 
cost effect dominates the risk of parallel trade effect.  
We estimate a reduced-form equation for delay in launch, using expected price and expected sales 
volume as explanatory variables. We also include an indicator variable for whether the firm is launching 
in its country of domicile (HOME). This is expected to be positively associated with launch if either 
regulators tend to favor their domestic firms or simply if firms are more familiar with the regulatory 
process in their home country or anticipate more favorable market uptake because of being a local firm. 
We also include a firm’s worldwide outpatient sales at the beginning of our study period to represent its 
global experience. This is expected to be positive if firms experience significant learning by doing, hence 
gains from experience. Since this variable is the same across all countries for a given firm and NCE, it 
captures the firm’s internal experience with the launch process in general, not familiarity with a specific 
country’s regulatory system. This delay in launch equation is estimated using a hazard function, taking 
into account right censoring, i.e., the fact that some products are not launched in some countries.  
 
Testable Hypotheses 
Since we lack information on the dates of application for and approval of market authorization 
and application for and approval of price/reimbursement, we can not distinguish the delay caused by the 
authorization vs. the price/reimbursement process, except within the EU countries for the sample of drugs 
that went through the EMEA centralized procedure. We also cannot distinguish delay due to 
government’s administrative processes vs. delay that is related specifically to disagreement over the price. 
To some extent, these dates may be endogenous and subject to the decisions and interactions between the 
manufacturer and the government regulator. For example, in submission of market authorization 
applications, the manufacturer may initially put a low priority on countries expected to offer lower prices 
or requiring longer price/reimbursement negotiations. Within the EU, the pharmaceutical firm’s choice of 
   
 8 
the EMEA centralized or mutual recognition procedure may depend on product characteristics, firm 
experience, and cross-market spillover effects from parallel trade and external reference pricing. Except 
for the subgroup of EU countries and the sample of new drugs approved through the EMEA centralized 
procedure, we only estimate how expected price and expected sales volume affect the combined 
regulatory and price/reimbursement delay. Previous studies indicate that launch is sometimes earlier in 
the hospital sector. Since regulation in many countries focuses on the retail prices, and delay in obtaining 
reimbursement approval is most critical for retail sales (which typically account for roughly 80 percent of 
sales for most products), we focus on the launch of new drugs in the outpatient or retail sector. 
Specifically, this study aims to test the following hypotheses with respect to regulated markets: 
 
1. The lower the expected price, the longer the launch delay, controlling for product, firm, and 
country-specific factors. This would confirm that countries with lower prices face longer delays 
in launch.  
2. The larger the potential unit sales volume, the shorter the launch delay. This would confirm that 
manufacturers are willing to trade-off price and volume.   
3. Within the EU, the common parallel export countries experience longer launch delays, after 
controlling for expected price and expected sales volume and for the new drugs approved through 
the EMEA centralized procedure. This would confirm that manufacturers are willing to hold off 
launch in order to reduce the risk of parallel trade and external reference pricing.  
 
Two firm-specific factors may affect launch delay: 
 
4. Ceteris paribus, a firm with more launch experience is predicted to have shorter launch delays.  
5. A firm is expected to launch earlier in its home (or headquarter) country, assuming that domestic 
firms have greater familiarity with the regulatory and political process. On some countries, other 
factors favoring early launch by domestic firms include potential backlash for a delayed launch 
and possibly market preference for products of local firms, hence higher opportunity cost of 
delay, ceteris paribus.  
 
Data  
Our data are from two databases from IMS Health, a global market research company. IMS Drug 
Launches, hereafter called DL (http://www.ims-globla.com/products/lifecycle/launches.htm) records new 
drug launches in 60 major markets of the world and records their NCE status, trade names, active 
ingredients, marketing companies, pack description, launch date, indication, therapeutic class, etc. We are 
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interested in the launch experience of global NCEs in the retail markets of the 25 major markets in the 
1990s. Table 3 lists the 25 countries. We define a “global” NCE as a NCE launched in either the UK or 
the US during the study period. The assumption is that manufacturers would seek to launch a NCE in 
either or both of these markets if the NCE could pass these countries’ relatively stringent hurdles. Thus 
NCEs that were launched in at least one of these markets are potentially global in that there is a strong 
presumption that they could meet the regulatory standards of other markets. We focus on launch in the 
outpatient sector because this accounts for roughly 80 percent of total drug sales in most countries and 
because price regulation focuses on prices for the outpatient sector.3  
Using the DL database, we identified a total of 220 NCEs launched between October, 1994 and 
September, 1999. Of these, we excluded eighty NCEs because they were only launched in the hospital 
sector. An additional 45 NCEs were excluded due to no launch in the US or the UK. Finally, 10 NCEs 
that were first launched after October, 1998 were excluded to allow a minimum observation period of 12 
months for launch in other countries. Our final sample thus consists of 85 global NCEs that were first 
launched in the outpatient sector in our 25 countries between October, 1994 and October, 1998. Of these, 
29 NCEs were approved through the EMEA centralized procedure, including 4 biotech products (List A) 
for which approval through the centralized procedure is mandatory.  
For these 85 NCEs, we extracted outpatient launch date (month/year) and other sales 
characteristics from the IMS MIDAS database (http://www.ims-global.com/products/sales/midas.htm). 
MIDAS contains sales data on prescription drugs from country-specific audits of wholesalers and other 
sources. For each product in each country, MIDAS reports the molecule name, therapeutic class, 
international and local brand names, launch date, manufacturer(s), ex-manufacturer price, formulation, 
and sales volume for hospital and retail channels. We obtained MIDAS sales data for the 24 quarters 
between the fourth quarter of 1993 and the third quarter of 1999. We used sales data in Quarter 3 and 
Quarter 4 prior to a NCE’s first launch date to estimate expected price and expected sales volume (see 
details in Variable Definitions below). 
 
Variable Definitions 
We define a NCE’s global launch date as the earliest of country-specific launch dates in the 25 
study countries’ retail markets. As these 25 study countries include all the major pharmaceutical markets, 
this first launch date is probably a NCE’s first launch worldwide in the retail market. A NCE’s launch 
delay in a country, conditional on an observed launch, is simply the difference in months between the 
global launch date and the country-specific launch date. In the descriptive statistics table (Table 3), we 
                                                 
3 Drug prices for the hospital sector are often negotiated between the hospital and the manufacturer, even in 
countries that strictly regulate drug prices for outpatient/retail sales.  
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report for each country both the number of NCEs launched in that country during the study period and the 
number of NCEs that were launched within 12 months of their respective global launch dates.  
We use the IMS Anatomical Therapeutic Classification (ATC) system to categorize a NCE’s 
therapeutic class. The IMS ATC system, which is similar to the WHO ATC system, classifies drugs by 
body system (alimentary, cardiovascular, etc), indication, and mechanism of action. There are up to four 
levels within the ATC system but many therapeutic classes have only three levels. We define a NCE’s 
therapeutic class using its 3-digit ATC. Our 85 global NCEs represent 36 different therapeutic classes. 
For NCEs that were in a new 3-digit therapeutic class, we used a related 2- or 3-digit therapeutic class for 
calculating the expected prices and volume.4 Data for 5 therapeutic classes were missing in Sweden or 
Norway, so we had a theoretical maximum of 2120 instead of 2125 potential launches for the 85 NCEs in 
the 25 countries. There are 1167 observed launches, indicating that approximately 45 percent of launches 
did not occur during the study period.  
The MIDAS database reports price at the ex-manufacturer level, i.e., a manufacturer’s selling 
price to wholesalers. For each NCE, we defined its expected price in a country as the volume-weighted 
average price per standard unit (SU) for all products in its therapeutic class in Quarter 3 and Quarter 4 
prior to its first launch date. The IMS SU is defined as the smallest dose for each product form, for 
example, one tablet, one capsule, 5 milliliters of liquid, etc. To the extent that the mix of dosage forms in 
a therapeutic category differs across countries, this weighted average price may not be strictly comparable 
across countries. However, it should be representative of the expected dosage forms for that country. 
Moreover, the alternatives have similar or worse problems. Price per pack is biased by the significant 
differences in pack size across countries; another alternative is price per gram of active ingredient, but the 
distribution of price per gram, across dosage forms and across products within a therapeutic class, is even 
more skewed than price per standard unit. We used this expected price rather than the observed launch 
price for several reasons.  First, price is an outcome of the launch negotiation and is determined 
simultaneously with launch delay. We lack the identifying variables necessary to estimate these two 
endogenous variables simultaneously. Second, forty five percent of launches and launch prices were not 
observed during our study period. Note that the MIDAS price data for the US and the UK are upward 
biased because they are based on list prices and do not reflect off-invoice discounts. Specifically, the US 
price does not reflect off-invoice discounts given by manufacturers to managed care purchasers, Medicaid 
and other public purchasers. Similarly, the Midas data for UK prices do not reflect all discounts given to 
pharmacists. However, since these discounts in both countries are usually less in early years of the 
product life-cycle, omitting these discounts probably does not lead to serious bias for our estimates of 
                                                 
4 These therapeutic classes (and their proxies) are C9C (C9), J5C (J5), N7D (N7), and R3J (R3D). 
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expected launch price. In addition, we include country indicators in some of the statistical models, which 
should control for any country-specific bias. 
All prices in local currencies are converted to prices in UK sterling. We chose sterling as our base 
currency because the majority of study countries are European countries. Moreover, the UK is a major 
parallel import market, hence the measure of other EU prices in terms of sterling is the most relevant 
measure for the purpose of considering the parallel import impact of accepting a particular launch price. 
All prices are inflated to December 1999 pounds, based on the UK wholesale price index.  
As a measure of expected sales volume, we use sales in SUs in the therapeutic class in Quarter 3 
and Quarter 4 prior to a NCE’s first global date. For Sweden and Denmark, the MIDAS database only 
reports the combined hospital and retail sales. Therefore, our measured expected sales volume is biased 
upward in these two countries. The expected price may also be biased if there is a systematic difference in 
prices between the retail and hospital sectors in these countries. Again, the presence of country indicators 
in some of our statistical models controls for any such bias.    
NCEs that are launched in the originator firm’s home country are identified by an indicator 
variable HOME. For recently merged companies, the HOME indicator is turned on for launches in both 
home countries. Finally, we measured a firm’s global launch experience (SALES) using its worldwide 
outpatient sales in UK pounds in Quarter 3 and Quarter 4 at the beginning of the study period.  
 
Statistical Model 
 We used the Cox proportional hazard model to analyze the lag and occurrence of launch. For 
each NCE, our choice of origin is its first launch date among the 25 countries, with subsequent launches 
represented by the time lag (in months) between a country-specific launch date and the global launch 
date. In the Cox model, the hazard of a NCE launch for country i at time t is the product of two factors:   
hi(t) = λo(t) exp{β1xi1 + …+ β1xik}, 
 i.e., a baseline, unspecified, non-negative hazard function λo(t) and the exponential of a linear function 
with k covariates, including expected price, expected sales volume, HOME, SALES, etc. The Cox model 
is semi-parametric in the sense that it does not specify the baseline hazard function λo(t) and only 
estimates the β coefficients using the maximum partial likelihood method. Specifications of λo(t) lead to 
parametric proportional hazards models. For example, it becomes the Weibull model when λo(t) = tα. 
(Dranove and Meltzer, 1994) The statistical software that we used for the Cox partial likelihood 
estimation is the PHREG procedure in SAS version 8.01 (Allison, 1995).  
The set of explanatory variables contributing to launch delay includes expected price, expected 
volume of units, SALES, HOME, therapeutic category indicators (1-digit ATCs), and country indicators 
(relative to the UK). Except for the Full model (to be defined below), not all variables are present. Log 
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transformations of expected price, expected volume, and SALES are used as their distributions are 
skewed and approximately log normal. For an indicator variable with values of 1 and 0, the hazard ratio is 
the ratio of the estimated hazard for those with value 1 over the estimated hazard for those with a value of 
0 (controlling for the other variables). For a continuous variable, subtracting 1.0 from the estimated 
hazard ratio and multiplying by 100 gives the percent change in the hazard for each one unit change in the 
explanatory variable.  
Our key variables of interest, expected price and expected volume, are potentially correlated with 
the country indicators. We estimate three main Cox models, to test for separate effects of country 
characteristics, expected price and volume, or both. First, the Country Comparison model includes only 
SALES, main therapeutic class indicators (1-digit ATC indicators), and country indicators. In this model, 
the country indicators reflect the combined effect of all country characteristics, including expected price, 
expected market size and other country characteristics, such as the regulatory system. We expected the 
coefficient for SALES to be positive and those indicators for the lower-price countries, including parallel 
export EU countries, to be negative. Second, the Expected Price-Volume model includes expected price, 
expected sales volume, SALES, HOME, and main therapeutic class indicators but excludes country fixed 
effects. In this model, the coefficients for expected price, expected volume, and HOME are expected to be 
positive. Finally, we estimated the Full model with all explanatory variables. Including country and ATC 
fixed effects, the expected price and sales volume variables measure the within-therapeutic-class variation 
over time in the same country. The country indicators reflect country effects other than expected price and 
sales volume, such as bureaucratic delays or country-specific propensities to be a base for parallel exports 
or for external referencing, beyond the pure price effect. 
As described earlier, since 1995 the EU has offered a choice of two alternative routes for market 
authorization – centralized procedure or mutual recognition.5 Initially, the centralized procedure was 
required for biotechnology products (List A) and optional for other innovative drugs, but more 
pharmaceutical manufacturers have chosen it in recent years (List B). The centralized procedure is 
intended to accelerate the market authorization process, by granting a single EU-wide authorization. The 
mutual recognition approach gives a company the option of not seeking authorization in certain markets, 
if it does not plan to launch in those markets. It may also be faster, depending on the rapporteur country 
selected and the backlog in each channel. Centralized authorization does not obviate the requirement to go 
through country-specific negotiations over price/reimbursement before retail launch in all countries that 
require such approval. Previous studies have documented the number of products going through each 
route but little is known about the factors that contribute to the choice of the centralized procedure. 
                                                 
5 Using individual national systems is a third possibility but is unlikely to be a desirable alternative for potentially 
global NCEs.  
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Anecdotally, it is hypothesized that the centralized procedure would increase exposure to parallel trade, 
because authorization occurs in all EU countries with a common dosage form, pack size, labeling etc. 
This eliminates the firm’s ability to target different dosages to different countries, and reduces the parallel 
trader’s costs associated with repackaging and providing labels in the language of the importing country. 
We model the choice of the EMEA centralized procedure for the List B products using a logit model, with 
expected EU price, expected EU sales volume, and a NCE’s rank in its therapeutic class during our study 
period as explanatory variables. The expected EU price and EU volume variables were defined as 
weighted averages over the price and volume in Quarter 3 and Quarter 4 prior to global launch, over all 
the 14 EU countries. Thus these variables are EU equivalents of the country-specific variables used in the 
country analysis. We defined a NCE rank indicator variable FIRST that takes the value 1 for the first 
molecule (by global launch date) in each therapeutic class, 0 otherwise. For the sample of 29 NCEs 
approved through the centralized procedure, we then estimate the three Cox hazard models. Although the 
sample size is small and non-randomly selected, the fact that they had the same delay in market 
authorization makes them an ideal sample to study the net impact on delay of pricing and reimbursement 
negotiations in the EU countries.  
As the study period ranges from October 1994 to September 1999, the observation period for 
launch in other countries after the first global launch of a NCE ranges from 12 to 50 months. Obviously, 
the earlier a NCE’s first launch date, the longer the observation period. Such right censoring applies to all 
countries so should not induce bias, but does differ across NCEs. We test the robustness of our findings 
using two alternative specifications. The first is to stratify the Cox model by the 85 NCEs. This is 
equivalent to assuming a different baseline hazard function for each NCE. The main drawback is that the 
effect of all NCE-specific factors that are invariant across countries such as SALES, are embedded in the 
baseline hazard functions and not separately estimated. In this NCE Fixed Effect Cox model, we tested 
the robustness of our findings on 3 main variables – expected price, expected volume, and HOME. The 
second specification estimates a logit model with launch of a NCE within 12 months after its first global 
launch date as the dependent variable. This logit model does not incur the unequal right censoring across 
NCEs but does not take into account launch differences within 12 months or launches after 12 months. 
 
Results  
NCE, Firm, and Country Characteristics 
Table 1 lists the distribution of the 85 global NCEs by therapeutic class and the number in each 
class that were approved through the EMEA centralized procedure. The highest number of NCEs (n=19) 
was for central nervous system, followed by systemic anti-infectives (n=12) and alimentary tract (n=10). 
The gynecological, urological system and sex hormones had the lowest number of NCEs (n=2). Among 
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the main therapeutic classes, the unweighted average expected price is highest in J (systemic anti-
infectives) and lowest in R (respiratory system); the unweighted average expected market size is highest 
in C (cardiovascular system) and lowest in L (oncology).    
Table 2 lists the distribution of the total number of NCEs launched per firm during the study 
period. A total of 40 pharmaceutical or biotechnology firms were involved in the launch of the 85 global 
NCEs. When 2 or more firms were associated with a NCE, we designated as the originator the firm 
responsible for the first launch; if two firms launched simultaneously or a jointly venture of two firms 
first launched a NCE, both firms were identified as the originators. Half of the firms (n=20) only launched 
1 NCE during the study period, and the highest number of NCEs launched by one firm is 7. The average 
SALES for the 40 drug firms is 609 million UK pounds, with a standard deviation of 545 million UK 
pounds.  
Characteristics of the 25 study countries are summarized in Table 3. None of the countries had all 
the 85 NCEs launched during the study period. The three countries that do not require price approval 
before launch had the most launches: the US led with 73 launches, followed by Germany (n=66) and the 
UK (n=64). At the other extreme, only 13 NCEs were launched in Japan, followed by Portugal (n=26) 
and New Zealand (n=28). Countries with fewer launches also tend to have a longer average launch delay 
for those NCEs that are launched (Figure 2), and fewer NCEs launched within 12 months of the global 
launch date (Figure 3). The US, the UK, and Germany had the 3 shortest average launch delays and the 
highest number of launches within 12 months, while Japan and Portugal had the longest average launch 
delays and were among the 3 countries with the lowest number of launches within 12 months. Average 
launch delay ranged from 4.2 months for the US to 23.5 months for Japan. US-based firms launched 36 
NCEs, followed by the UK (n=12), Switzerland (n=10), and Germany (n=9).  
Countries with fewer launches seem to have a lower (unweighted) average expected price, with 
Japan being the major exception (Figure 4). There are significant cross-country differences in average 
expected price (for the 85 NCEs), with an over-13-fold difference between Japan (the highest) and Poland 
(the lowest). This suggests that, although these two countries both have long launch delays and few 
launches, the contributing factors are different in these two countries. In Japan, market authorization or 
regulatory delay in approving a price are likely to be more important contributors to delay than the 
manufacturer’s willingness to accept delay because of a low price. By contrast, in Portugal, the low 
expected price appears to be the dominant factor. The distribution in unweighted average expected 
volume (for the 85 NCEs) is even more skewed than for average expected price. It should be noted that 
these cross-country differences in expected price and volume vary significantly across therapeutic classes. 
For example, for the 36 therapeutic classes, the US’s rank in expected price ranges from 1 to 24 (median = 
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3); Poland’s rank ranges from 5 to 25 (median = 25). In addition, the US’s rank in expected volume ranges 
from 1 to 13 (median = 1); Poland’s rank ranges from 1 to the 22 (median = 9).   
 
Cox Regressions 
 Results from the Country Comparison Cox model (Table 4) confirm the simple statistics in Table 
3, showing that there are statistically significant differences among the 25 markets in access to new drugs. 
Compared to the UK, Japan had the most negative coefficient (hazard ratio = 0.071), followed by 
Portugal (hazard ratio = 0.156) and New Zealand (hazard ratio = 0.185). There are significant differences 
across several therapeutic classes, with cardiovascular system (C) and gynecological, urological system 
and sex hormones (G) having relatively short delay. Since the cardiovascular system has the highest 
expected sales volume, its effect is consistent with the hypothesis that manufacturers are less willing to 
accept delay when foregone sales are large. There are only 2 NCEs in the gynecological, urological 
system and sex hormones, one of which is sildenafil (Viagra), which may have biased the estimated class 
effect due to the launch of sildenafil (Viagra) without reimbursement in some countries. These ATC 
effects remain significant after controlling for expected price and volume, which suggests that other 
differences in the underlying diseases and their drug treatment choices may play a role. SALES is 
significantly positive, indicating that the launching firm’s global experience accelerates the launch 
process.  
The coefficients for the explanatory variables present in both the Expected Price-Volume Cox 
model and the Full Cox model (Table 4) are very similar. Both expected price and expected volume have 
a significant positive effect on the hazard of launch, i.e., reducing launch delay, with a larger effect for 
expected price than for volume. In the Expected Price-Volume model, a 10% increase in expected price or 
expected volume are associated with a 2.7 percent or 1.0 percent increase in launch hazard respectively. 
To test whether a firm is willing to accept a lower price in larger markets such as France, we tested the 
interaction between expected price and expected volume but this interaction was not significant at 
conventional levels. This could reflect the fact that countries with larger expected volume have higher 
opportunity cost of delay, but also may pose a larger threat of parallel trade, since there is a larger supply 
pool to divert to parallel exports. In addition, a firm’s global launch experience (SALES) and its home 
country (HOME) are both positive contributors to early launch, consistent with the hypothesis that launch 
experience in general and in the home country are valuable in reducing launch delay.  
With the introduction of country indicators in the Full model, the coefficients for expected price 
and expected sales volume are essentially unchanged. The coefficient of home country becomes smaller 
but remains significantly positive. The two alternative specifications -- the NCE Fixed Effect Cox model 
(Table 4) and the logit model for launch within 12 months (results available upon request) -- further 
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validate the findings on expected price, expected volume and HOME reported in Table 4 (results 
available upon request).  Compared with the Country Comparison model, many country indicators remain 
significantly negative and hazard ratios are often larger in the Full model. Since the Full model controls 
for expected price and volume, the country indicators presumably reflect either bureaucratic delays or 
expected cross-market spillover effects such as parallel trade and external reference pricing, over and 
above the related effects that are associated with low price. Japan continues to have the most negative 
hazard ratio, followed by Portugal and New Zealand. Within the EU, the 6 countries with the most 
negative coefficients are Portugal, Italy, France, Belgium, Spain, and Greece. These are all countries with 
strict price controls and are likely major parallel export countries. To test whether delays in these parallel 
exporting countries increased following the introduction of the EMEA in 1995, which accelerated market 
authorization, we created an indicator variable for NCEs first launched after October 1996, the middle 
point of our study period. We tested its interaction with the above country indicators but found no 
evidence of longer country-specific delay effects after October 1996. However, our sample size of NCEs 
launched before the EMEA may be too small to observe significant effects. Moreover, since our measure 
reflects the combined delay of market authorization and price approval through launch, the hypothesized 
increase in delay in the post-authorization period may be offset by more rapid authorization after the 
EMEA.  
 
EU Subgroup Analysis  
 Table 1 shows that the distribution of NCEs approved through the EMEA centralized procedure, 
by therapeutic class, differs from the distribution of the full sample of 85 NCEs. For example, 8 of the 12 
NCEs in the systemic anti-infective class, were approved through the centralized procedure, while only 1 
out of the 9 cardiovascular NCEs used the centralized procedure. All 6 HIV/AIDS drugs in the systemic 
anti-infective class that were launched after 1995 used the EMEA centralized procedure. These products 
faced strong political pressure for rapid launch in all countries, which may have contributed to the choice 
of the centralized procedure.  
Characteristics of the 14 EU countries for these 29 NCEs were summarized in Table 5. The three 
countries with the most launches are Sweden (n=23), Denmark (n=22), and Germany (n=21); the four 
countries with the fewest launches are Portugal (n=5), Italy (n=8), Greece (n=12), and Spain (n=12). Thus 
approval through the centralized procedure is no guarantee of prompt launch in all countries. The 
delays/non-launch can be attributed unambiguously to the price/reimbursement system. Average launch 
delay ranges from 8.1 months for Germany to 17.4 months for Greece; however average delay is not as 
strongly correlated with number of launches as in the full sample (Figure 5). Similar to the full sample of 
85 NCEs in the 25 study countries (Table 3), countries with fewer launches seem to have fewer launches 
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within the first 12 months after global launch (Figure 6). Whereas in the full sample the UK ranked third 
and second, after the US, in number of drugs launched and average launch delay respectively, in the 
EMEA sample the UK drops to fourth in number of launches and third in mean delay. This pattern of 
relatively slower launch in the UK in the post-1996 period is consistent with the hypothesis that review by 
the National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE) may have slowed the launch of drugs in the UK, 
relative to other less regulated markets of Europe. However, such conclusions are tentative because of the 
small sample size. Among the 14 EU countries, France, Italy, and Portugal have the lowest average 
expected prices, deviating significantly from the other countries, and there appears to be a positive 
association between the number of EMEA NCEs launched and the average expected price (Figure 7). 
Germany, France, and Italy have the highest average expected volume. It should be noted that, similar to 
the full sample in Table 3, a country’s rank in expected price and expected volume vary significantly by 
therapeutic classes (see Table 5). 
The Cox model analysis for the centralized procedure subgroup is reported in Table 6. Recall that 
for this subgroup variation in launch dates should reflect solely the influence of price/reimbursement 
factors, since market authorization occurred simultaneously through the EMEA. In the Expected Price-
Volume model, the effect of expected price is greater for the EMEA subgroup (hazard ratio 1.67) than for 
the full sample (hazard ratio 1.27). In the Full model, the coefficient and hazard ratio for expected price is 
similar in the EMEA subgroup and the full sample but its significance is lower in the EMEA sample, 
possibly due to the small sample size. Expected volume does not have a significant effect on launch in the 
EMEA sample. The same list of countries -- Portugal, Italy, Greece, Belgium, Spain, and France -- have 
significant negative country effects on launch, controlling for expected price and volume (all p<0.0001). 
Thus these findings in the full model appear to be attributable to the price regulatory systems in these 
countries, not to their market authorization systems. Among the 29 NCEs, four NCEs (2 in therapeutic 
class S, 1 in D, and 1 in L) were not launched in any EU countries during the study period. Exclusion of 
these NCEs did not affect the results. The NCE Fixed Effect Cox model (Table 6) and the logit sensitivity 
analyses (available upon request) confirmed these findings.   
 Finally, we examined the determinants of the choice of centralized procedure. We have a total of 
80 products with global launch dates after January 1, 1996, which in theory might have used the 
centralized procedure. Of these, 29 or 36 percent used the centralized procedure; for 4 of these the choice 
was mandatory and these 4 are excluded from the analysis Our theoretical model implies that firms are 
less likely to use the centralized procedure for NCEs that are most exposed to parallel trade, since the 
simultaneous approval of uniform dosage forms in all countries increases the likelihood of parallel trade 
by reducing traders costs of repackaging and labeling. In Table 7, we report the results of logit estimates 
for the sample of 76 products launched after 1996. In the reduced model (with expected EU price 
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removed), expected EU volume and FIRST (being the first drug in its therapeutic class during our study 
period) are significantly negatively related to choice of the centralized procedure. Not shown in Table 7, 
the global launch date of a NCE was not significant, controlling for FIRST, and was removed from the 
logit model. The negative effect of expected EU volume is consistent with the hypothesis that large 
potential market size, hence high risk of parallel trade, discourages use of the centralized procedure. The 
similar effect for first in class is surprising, since initially the EMEA was intended to focus on innovative 
drugs. It is possible that the observed negative effect of being first in class may also reflect an expected 
volume effect, since first-in-class drugs often have a first mover advantage and retain relatively large 
sales, compared to follower products, for several years after launch. Thus first-in-class products may be 
more at risk for parallel trade than follower products. First-in-class products may also be more at risk of 
price spillovers through regulation based on external referencing, because for first-in-class products there 
are no similar products already on the market that could serve as an internal benchmark for regulating 
price. Thus if first-in-class products are more at risk, relative to follower products, of cross-national price 
spillovers due to both parallel trade and external referencing, this could lead manufacturers of first-in-
class products to choose the mutual recognition procedure rather than the centralized procedure, because 
mutual recognition may permit more flexibility for varying formulations, launch dates and other strategies 
that reduce the risk of cross-national price spillovers. These conclusions are tentative because of the 
sample is small and is drawn from the start-up phase of the EMEA.  
 
Discussion 
 This study of launch lags for 85 new, globally important drugs in the 25 major markets during the 
mid-late 1990s finds significant variation across countries in both the number of drugs launched and the 
mean delay from the first global launch. The number of NCEs launched ranges from 73 in the US, with a 
mean lag of 4.2 months, to 13 in Japan, with a mean lag of 23.5 months. There is a strong correlation 
between these two outcomes. Large variation also exists within the European Union and even for products 
that are approved through the centralized procedure, which receive market authorization simultaneously 
in all countries. Of the 29 EMEA-approved NCEs since 1996, 23 were launched in Sweden, compared to 
only 5 in Portugal, 8 in Italy and 13 in France during our study period.  
In general, the countries that have strict price regulation tend to have fewer products launched and 
longer delays. This is confirmed by the multivariate Cox proportional hazard model. We find that 
countries/products with lower expected prices experienced longer launch delays. The magnitude of the 
expected price effect is similar in the EMEA sample and the full sample. Since all variation in the EMEA 
sample can be attributed to delays associated with price-reimbursement regulation, it seems safe to infer 
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that the expected price effect that we observe in the full sample does in fact reflect delays in launch that 
are due to price regulation.  
Controlling for expected price, countries with strict regulation and that are likely major parallel 
exporters (Portugal, Italy, France, Belgium, Spain, and Greece) also have negative country fixed effects 
that presumably reflect delays due to the bureaucratic process or expected parallel trade effects, beyond 
the pure price effect. Because the sample is censored after September 1999, it is possible that some NCEs 
have or will subsequently be launched in the lower-price countries. However, this censoring bias should 
not affect our estimates of cross-country effects since it applies equally to all countries. These country 
effects persist after controlling for the country of domicile of the launching firm. Thus the tendency for 
earlier and more numerous launches in the US, the UK and Germany does not simply reflect the fact that 
the drugs were launched disproportionately by firms from these countries.  
Controlling for expected price and country fixed effects, larger markets have shorter launch 
delays. This is consistent with the hypothesis that manufacturers weigh the opportunity costs of launch 
delay and that their incentive for prompt launch of potentially high volume products dominates any 
incentive of regulators to delay the launch of high volume products that could have disproportionate 
budget impact. These findings are robust to alternative specifications. Finally, firms with more global 
launch experience, indicated by the baseline worldwide outpatient sales, have smaller launch delays. 
One limitation of this study is the lack of data to separate out the authorization delay from the 
price/reimbursement delay and, within the price/reimbursement delay, the component that is due strictly 
to the administrative process versus the component that is related to disagreement over the price. The 
availability of such data might shed light on the sequential game underlying new drug price and launch 
decisions. Another limitation is that we did not test the effect of delay on actual launch prices, 
specifically, whether manufacturers that delay launch in lower-price countries get higher prices return. 
We do not attempt to draw policy conclusions from this analysis. Such conclusions would require 
knowing the effect of delays in launch of new drugs on use of other medical services, on the direct and 
indirect costs of medical care and on health outcomes. The foregone health benefits from delay in launch 
are likely to be greater for NCEs that are truly innovative, but there is no consensus measure of this.6 
Further, our measure of launch in the outpatient sector is only a rough measure of availability of a drug to 
patients. Some new drugs are launched in the hospital sector before the outpatient sector, so patients may 
have some access before our observed launch date. Conversely, even after the outpatient launch, 
availability of a new drug may limit by protocols and, in some cases, by financial barriers if the drug is 
                                                 
6 There is no universally accepted indicator of the innovativeness and importance of a new drug. The FDA rating is 
only available for those drugs that were launched in the US. In any case, it does not necessarily reflect the market’s 
evaluation of the importance of a drug or its expected commercial success (see, for example, Dranove and Meltzer 
(1994), which is measured by our expected price and expected market size variables. 
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not covered by insurance or only with significant patient copayment. To the extent that delay reflects real 
uncertainty as to whether the new drug is cost-effective and worth paying for, given the norms and 
budgets of each country’s health care system, then there is some benefit if delay helps resolve these 
issues, to offset against the cost in foregone benefits to patients. To the extent that delay reflects primarily 
rational strategies by manufacturers to avoid price spillovers from low price to high price countries, this 
would suggest that policies that support parallel trade and external referencing might be imposing 
significant costs in terms of foregone access to new drugs. 
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Table 1. Distribution of 85 NCEs and 25 EMEA-CP-Approved NCEs by 1-Digit ATC.
ATC Name All NCEs EMEA NCEs
Mean STD Mean STD
A Alimentary Tract 10 3 0.162 0.181 140691 282265
B Blood and Blood Forming Organs 5 2 0.148 0.194 68629 81249
C Cardiovascular System 9 1 0.322 0.146 233334 355877
D Dermatologicals 5 2 0.642 0.858 67047 204639
G Gynecological, Urological System and Sex Hormones 2 1 0.216 0.142 128316 240878
J Systemic Anti-Infectives 12 8 1.207 0.670 18383 49070
L Oncology 9 4 0.712 0.489 9471 19111
M Musculo-Skeletal System 4 1 0.716 0.527 82120 235307
N Central Nervous System 19 5 0.218 0.384 84217 170205
R Respiratory System 4 0 0.129 0.096 221560 331555
S Sensory Organs 6 2 0.487 0.285 21670 56813
Total 85 29 0.474 0.567 90715 216489
Expected Price (All NCEs) Expected Volume (All NCEs)
Table 2. Distribution of 85 NCEs by Firm.
Number of NCEs Number of Firms
1 20
2 9
3 4
4 3
5 2
6 1
7 1
Total 40
Table 3. Country Characteristics for 85 Global NCEs.
COUNTRY Launched NCEs Launched in 12 months HOME
Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Median Min Max Median Min Max
AUSTRALIA 43 14.1 7.6 17 0 0.377 0.418 58063 70201 16 2 25 11 4 20
AUSTRIA 54 12.4 9.4 31 0 0.540 0.641 22179 26904 13 1 22 16 10 25
BELGIUM 41 18.2 7.6 8 0 0.525 0.541 27298 27544 9 1 21 15 9 25
CANADA 56 12.2 7.8 28 0 0.462 0.413 73840 84062 11 2 24 8 4 18
CZECH 31 21.4 9.7 6 0 0.202 0.250 25748 36590 23 4 25 18 8 24
DENMARK 62 11.8 8.9 39 3 0.557 0.539 14603 14938 9 1 25 18 10 25
GERMANY 66 8.8 8.7 50 10 0.538 0.574 268216 320052 11 1 23 3 1 9
FINLAND 57 11.6 8.4 37 1 0.568 0.587 15158 17856 10 1 21 20 12 25
FRANCE 45 14.9 9.1 19 7 0.347 0.338 228560 224945 15 2 25 3 1 11
GREECE 45 18.6 10.1 10 0 0.421 0.427 22089 27713 15 2 25 16 10 22
HOLLAND 48 10.2 8.3 34 0 0.583 0.594 35733 38902 8 1 20 13 6 23
IRELAND 44 10.0 8.6 30 0 0.420 0.464 7165 9711 15 8 23 24 15 25
ITALY 44 17.2 9.3 13 1 0.345 0.293 134928 167211 18 1 24 5 2 12
JAPAN 13 23.5 16.7 4 4 0.969 1.157 234705 378785 3 1 25 5 1 24
MEXICO 45 14.8 9.4 19 0 0.248 0.263 43998 57491 21 3 25 13 2 25
NEW ZEALAND 28 13.4 6.6 11 0 0.501 0.643 9730 14548 14 1 24 22 14 25
NORWAY 47 15.5 8.7 17 0 0.562 0.564 12217 13371 10 1 23 21 15 25
POLAND 31 20.5 7.9 3 0 0.075 0.065 84969 120081 25 5 25 9 1 22
PORTUGAL 26 22.1 11.0 4 0 0.335 0.321 32869 44744 18 5 24 14 9 24
SOUTH AFRICA 38 14.4 6.8 12 0 0.409 0.383 11639 22264 12 2 24 23 9 25
SPAIN 49 15.7 8.0 16 0 0.403 0.484 107530 111375 18 6 25 7 3 12
SWEDEN 62 7.8 7.1 45 8 0.626 0.818 35979 49392 13 1 25 12 6 25
SWITZITERLAND 56 9.7 8.0 36 14 0.681 0.677 16831 19262 3 1 22 18 5 25
USA 73 4.2 7.4 65 38 0.681 0.488 558194 596543 3 1 24 1 1 13
UK 64 7.2 8.3 53 12 0.473 0.574 180293 266268 16 2 24 6 1 16
Total 1168 12.8 9.6 607 98 0.474 0.567 90715 216489
Launch Delay (if launched) Expected Price Rank Expected Volume RankExpected VolumeExpected Price
Table 4. Cox Model Results on the Launch of 85 Global NCEs in 25 Countries.
Model
Variable Name Coefficient SE P Value Hazard Ratio Coefficient SE P Value Hazard Ratio Coefficient SE P Value Hazard Ratio Coefficient SE P Value Hazard Ratio
Log (Expected Price) 0.236 0.035 <.0001 1.266 0.220 0.047 <.0001 1.246
Log (Expected Volume) 0.094 0.020 <.0001 1.098 0.141 0.035 <.0001 1.152 0.236 0.042 <.0001 1.267
Log (SALES) 0.181 0.023 <.0001 1.198 0.150 0.022 <.0001 1.162 0.178 0.023 <.0001 1.195 0.063 0.022 0.005 1.065
HOME 1.251 0.116 <.0001 3.494 0.771 0.127 <.0001 2.161 1.681 0.131 <.0001 5.368
Country Indicators
AUSTRALIA -1.149 0.198 <.0001 0.317 -0.887 0.203 <.0001 0.412
AUSTRIA -0.672 0.185 0.0003 0.511 -0.354 0.197 0.0718 0.702
BELGIUM -1.278 0.201 <.0001 0.279 -1.029 0.208 <.0001 0.357
CANADA -0.675 0.184 0.0002 0.509 -0.553 0.187 0.0031 0.575
CZECH -1.644 0.220 <.0001 0.193 -1.093 0.242 <.0001 0.335
DENMARK -0.380 0.179 0.0331 0.684 -0.052 0.194 0.7869 0.949
GERMANY -0.094 0.176 0.5924 0.910 -0.278 0.178 0.118 0.757
FINLAND -0.512 0.183 0.0051 0.599 -0.145 0.200 0.4684 0.865
FRANCE -1.063 0.195 <.0001 0.345 -1.077 0.197 <.0001 0.341
GREECE -1.180 0.195 <.0001 0.307 -0.842 0.207 <.0001 0.431
HOLLAND -0.796 0.192 <.0001 0.451 -0.608 0.197 0.0021 0.544
IRELAND -0.924 0.196 <.0001 0.397 -0.381 0.227 0.0941 0.683
ITALY -1.163 0.196 <.0001 0.313 -1.104 0.198 <.0001 0.332
JAPAN -2.675 0.305 <.0001 0.069 -2.801 0.308 <.0001 0.061
MEXICO -1.077 0.195 <.0001 0.341 -0.714 0.206 0.0005 0.490
NEW ZEALAND -1.694 0.228 <.0001 0.184 -1.207 0.249 <.0001 0.299
NORWAY -0.979 0.193 <.0001 0.376 -0.580 0.211 0.0059 0.560
POLAND -1.680 0.220 <.0001 0.186 -1.174 0.237 <.0001 0.309
PORTUGAL -1.882 0.233 <.0001 0.152 -1.539 0.241 <.0001 0.215
SOUTH AFRICA -1.330 0.206 <.0001 0.265 -0.852 0.229 0.0002 0.426
SPAIN -0.995 0.190 <.0001 0.370 -0.858 0.192 <.0001 0.424
SWEDEN -0.163 0.179 0.3627 0.850 -0.010 0.184 0.9551 0.990
SWITZITERLAND -0.534 0.184 0.0036 0.586 -0.379 0.194 0.0501 0.684
USA 0.392 0.173 0.0235 1.480 -0.138 0.191 0.4677 0.871
1-digit ATC Indicators
A -0.303 0.130 0.0202 0.739 0.065 0.150 0.664 1.068 -0.132 0.157 0.4008 0.876
B -0.513 0.176 0.0035 0.599 -0.091 0.191 0.6356 0.913 -0.191 0.202 0.3437 0.826
C 0.425 0.116 0.0002 1.530 0.388 0.132 0.0032 1.475 0.290 0.145 0.0459 1.337
D -0.140 0.150 0.3518 0.870 0.213 0.155 0.1697 1.238 0.159 0.162 0.3246 1.172
G 1.120 0.176 <.0001 3.063 1.255 0.187 <.0001 3.509 1.221 0.191 <.0001 3.389
L -0.053 0.121 0.6619 0.949 0.145 0.122 0.2345 1.156 0.152 0.125 0.2245 1.164
M 0.019 0.164 0.9065 1.019 0.208 0.165 0.2069 1.231 0.167 0.166 0.314 1.182
N 0.218 0.100 0.029 1.243 0.481 0.123 <.0001 1.617 0.355 0.129 0.0058 1.427
R 0.181 0.145 0.2117 1.198 0.413 0.168 0.0136 1.512 0.206 0.177 0.2451 1.228
S 0.034 0.137 0.8031 1.035 0.223 0.140 0.1123 1.249 0.215 0.144 0.1349 1.239
Chi-Square (DF) 551 (35) <.0001 302 (14) <.0001 606 (38) <.0001 193 (3) <.0001
Full ModelExpected Price-Volume ModelCountry Comparison Model NCE Fixed Effect Model (Stratified by NCE)
Table 5. EU Country Characteristics for 29 EMEA-CP-Approved NCEs.
COUNTRY Launched NCEs Launched in 12 months HOME
Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Median Min Max Median Min Max
AUSTRIA 14 8.6 4.8 11 0 0.810 0.761 16499 22023 4 1 14 10 5 13
BELGIUM 15 17.4 8.6 4 0 0.749 0.678 16499 18073 5 1 14 9 5 12
DENMARK 22 10.6 5.9 15 1 0.702 0.587 10417 11888 6 1 14 11 6 13
GERMANY 21 8.1 5.1 17 2 0.747 0.649 210742 313212 7 1 14 1 1 4
FINLAND 18 9.7 6.0 13 1 0.755 0.680 9487 13219 6 1 11 12 8 14
FRANCE 13 14.2 8.9 5 3 0.384 0.342 175803 219496 12 1 14 2 1 5
GREECE 12 15.8 7.2 4 0 0.615 0.511 13031 22028 9 1 14 12 6 13
HOLLAND 16 9.1 7.0 12 0 0.799 0.747 22973 31546 4 1 12 7 4 13
IRELAND 13 8.1 5.3 9 0 0.630 0.565 3312 4679 8 3 13 14 11 14
ITALY 8 15.3 7.8 3 0 0.417 0.338 93560 130862 11 2 14 3 1 5
PORTUGAL 5 10.4 4.6 4 0 0.474 0.376 23189 42905 12 2 14 9 6 14
SPAIN 12 12.5 7.2 6 0 0.662 0.645 70140 95433 10 3 14 5 2 6
SWEDEN 23 10.1 5.9 14 1 0.770 0.727 22337 26527 10 1 13 6 4 14
UK 19 8.4 6.4 15 1 0.764 0.733 71606 94340 7 1 14 4 1 9
Total 211 10.9 7.0 132 9 0.663 0.619 54525 130136
Expected Volume RankLaunch Delay Expected Price Expected Volume Expected Price Rank
Table 6. Cox Model Results on the Launch of 29 EMEA-CP-Approved NCEs.
Model
Variable Name Coefficient SE P Value Hazard Ratio Coefficient SE P Value Hazard Ratio Coefficient SE P Value Hazard Ratio Coefficient SE P Value Hazard Ratio
Log (Expected Price) 0.512 0.161 0.002 1.668 0.253 0.170 0.138 1.288 0.421 0.200 0.036 1.524
Log (Expected Volume) 0.013 0.058 0.824 1.013 -0.097 0.110 0.379 0.907 0.059 0.061 0.331 1.061
Log (SALES) 0.069 0.038 0.072 1.072 0.069 0.039 0.079 1.072 0.090 0.040 0.024 1.095
HOME 0.477 0.356 0.180 1.612 -0.267 0.366 0.465 0.766 0.851 0.389 0.029 2.342
Country Indicators
AUSTRIA -1.008 0.371 0.007 0.365 -1.187 0.410 0.004 0.305
BELGIUM -1.208 0.350 0.001 0.299 -1.409 0.384 0.0002 0.244
DENMARK 0.047 0.316 0.882 1.048 -0.178 0.384 0.643 0.837
GERMANY 0.341 0.318 0.284 1.407 0.405 0.332 0.221 1.500
FINLAND -0.395 0.340 0.245 0.673 -0.681 0.425 0.109 0.506
FRANCE -1.160 0.363 0.001 0.314 -1.031 0.370 0.005 0.356
GREECE -1.427 0.372 0.0001 0.240 -1.629 0.441 0.000 0.196
HOLLAND -0.364 0.341 0.285 0.695 -0.512 0.362 0.157 0.599
IRELAND -0.819 0.362 0.024 0.441 -1.127 0.513 0.028 0.324
ITALY -1.855 0.424 <.0001 0.156 -1.800 0.426 <.0001 0.165
PORTUGAL -2.366 0.506 <.0001 0.094 -2.484 0.538 <.0001 0.083
SPAIN -1.277 0.372 0.001 0.279 -1.294 0.377 0.001 0.274
SWEDEN 0.213 0.312 0.496 1.237 0.129 0.342 0.707 1.138
1-digit ATC Indicators
A 1.384 0.267 <.0001 3.991 2.539 0.490 <.0001 12.667 2.386 0.503 <.0001 10.874
B 0.448 0.333 0.179 1.565 1.617 0.483 0.001 5.036 1.460 0.561 0.009 4.308
C 2.367 0.347 <.0001 10.664 2.711 0.387 <.0001 15.046 3.058 0.491 <.0001 21.280
D -0.676 0.384 0.079 0.509 -0.150 0.390 0.700 0.860 -0.556 0.427 0.194 0.574
G 2.703 0.339 <.0001 14.928 3.307 0.405 <.0001 27.294 3.280 0.422 <.0001 26.569
L -0.465 0.307 0.129 0.628 -0.200 0.307 0.514 0.818 -0.354 0.314 0.259 0.702
M 1.626 0.342 <.0001 5.085 1.512 0.340 <.0001 4.538 1.691 0.347 <.0001 5.425
N 1.475 0.203 <.0001 4.369 2.303 0.394 <.0001 10.008 2.282 0.405 <.0001 9.798
S -14.933 414.756 0.971 0.000 -14.205 450.357 0.975 0.000 -14.537 422.904 0.973 0.000
Chi-Square (DF) 280 (23) <.0001 191 (13) <.0001 283 (26) <.0001 10.4 (3) 0.015
Country Comparison Model Expected Price-Volume Model Full Model Stratified Model (by NCE)
Table 7. Logit Model Results on the Choice of EMEA Centralized Procedure. 
Variable Coefficient SE P Value Coefficient SE P Value
Intercept 4.644 3.289 0.158 5.268 2.504 0.035
FIRST -1.884 0.604 0.002 -1.902 0.602 0.002
Log (Expected EU Volume) -0.340 0.278 0.221 -0.399 0.188 0.034
Log (Expected EU Price) 0.122 0.423 0.774
Chi-Square (DF) 16.6 (3) 0.001 16.6 (2) 0.0003
Full Model Reduced Model

Figure 2. Number of NCEs launched and average launch delay, by country. 
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Figure 3. Total number of NCEs launched and number of NCEs launched within 12 months of first 
global launch, by country.  
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Figure 4. Number of NCEs launched and average expected price, by country. 
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Figure 5. Number of EMEA NCEs launched and average launch delay, EU countries.
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Figure 6. Number of EMEA NCEs launched within 12 months of first global launch, EU countries. 
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Figure 7. Number of EMEA NCEs launched and average expected price, EU countries.
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